Obfuscation methods

While i was scrolling my old mails in search of some financial document i found one interesting doc on which i was working long time back and due to some unknown reason didn't able to continue it. Here i am posting that unfinished work. I will try to cover topics in detail in  future .

 

Obfuscation

To totally obscure with non-germane information in a verbose manner, with the intent to provide a non-answer, and provide total befuddlement.

“Any hacker worth his salt is an artist in obfuscation”.

In network security, obfuscation refers to methods used to obscure an attack payload from inspection by network protection systems.

Encryption vs Obsfucation

Obfuscation
Obfuscation, in general, describes a practice that is used to intentionally make something more difficult to understand. In a programming context, it means to make code harder to understand or read, generally for privacy or security purposes. A tool called an obfuscator is sometimes used to convert a straight-forward program into one that works the same way but is much harder to understand.

Encryption

The manipulation of data to prevent accurate interpretation by all but those for whom the data is intended. Financial institutions use encryption to increase the security of data transmitted via the Internet.

Method of obfuscation

Recreational Obfuscation

There are many varieties of interesting obfuscations ranging from simple keyword substitution, use/non-use of whitespace to create artistic effects.

Obfuscation by code morphing

This is achieved by completely replacing a section of the compiled code with an entirely new block that expects the same machine state when it begins execution as the previous section, and will leave with the same machine state after execution as the original. However, a number of additional operations will be completed as well as some operations with an equivalent effect.

Obfuscation in malicious software

Spammers frequently use obfuscated JavaScript or HTML code in spam messages. The obfuscated message, when displayed by an HTML-capable e-mail client, appears as a reasonably normal message—albeit with obnoxious JavaScript behaviors such as spawning pop-up windows. However, when the source is viewed, the obfuscations make it far more difficult for investigators to discern where the links go, or what the JavaScript code does.

Trail obfuscation

The purpose of trail obfuscation is to confuse, disorientate and divert the forensic examination process. Trail obfuscation covers a variety of techniques and tools that include “log cleaners, spoofing, misinformation, backbone hoping, zombied accounts, trojan command”.

Advantages of obfuscation

Intellectual property protection

Reduced security exposure

Size reduction

Library linking

Disadvantages of obfuscation

When used alone

At best, obfuscation merely makes it time-consuming, but not impossible, to reverse engineer a

program. When security is important, measures other than obfuscation should be used.

Debugging

Obfuscated code is extremely difficult to debug. Variable names will no longer make sense, and the structure of the code itself will likely be modified beyond recognition. This fact generally forces developers to maintain two builds:

Portability

Obfuscated code often depends on the particular characteristics of the platform and compiler, making it difficult to manage if either change

Obfuscation for Evasion

Protection provided by Security devices can be bypassed by obfuscating the exploit/shellcode . Some of the known methods are:

Encoding

Directory traversing

Null characters

Spaces

Writing Security Story

Security Story is an artifact that anyone (developer, manager, business owner, user,  etc ) can read and feel assured that their security concerns are addressed.It is a collaborative effort that highlights how the implementation, application design, service infrastructure, organization processes, and the business environment itself protect what’s important to the business.

There is no fixed format or content for a security story as a security story should evolve over the life of an application. A story may contain text, images, diagrams, spreadsheets, links, and other formats.

security story can be write in many ways most commonly it can start with capturing the concerns of application stakeholders, including both application providers and application users followed by list down the lifelines of the application.You need to create strategy to defend the each lifeline.Build the specific defence and proof of these defenses should be included in story. security stories are not static they has to change when condition changes .

 

Reference: http://www.ruggedsoftware.org/

What It Takes To Be Rugged.

Recently one of my friend ask if there is any good reference to to incorporate security testing with agile development. Unfortunately we didn't able to find any such reference.Although Rugged  approach look promising and also claim to support agile way of security testing of application.  The ultimate goal of including Security testing in SDLC is to produce secure code.

Rugged approach doesn't focus only finding vulnerabilities but try to improve overall  capability of an organization to develop secure Code. To achieve this goal organization must establish process to monitor  upcoming threats. there should be a communication path so everyone can share all the security-relevant information about the application . A standard mechanism of defence should be use  across the organization . Don't trust third party component used in your product, establish guidelines for each component that details the secure use of that library. Build applications that will be largely resistant to the threats of the future for example using strong input validation, in-application attack detection and safe interpreter use can eliminate many flaws forever. Defences should  be continuously verified and monitored all the way through development and into production. Being Rugged means that you constantly patch and refactor your software development organization to eliminate the organizational bugs that are causing insecure code.

 

Reference: http://www.ruggedsoftware.org/

The Rugged Software Manifesto

• I am rugged and, more importantly, my code is rugged.
• I recognize that software has become a foundation of our modern world.
• I recognize the awesome responsibility that comes with this foundational role.
• I recognize that my code will be used in ways I cannot anticipate, in ways it was not designed, and for longer than it was ever intended.
• I recognize that my code will be attacked by talented and persistent adversaries who threaten our physical, economic, and national security.
• I recognize these things - and I choose to be rugged.
• I am rugged because I refuse to be a source of vulnerability or weakness.
• I am rugged because I assure my code will support its mission.
• I am rugged because my code can face these challenges and persist in spite of them.
• I am rugged, not because it is easy, but because it is necessary and I am up for the challenge.

 

Reference: http://www.ruggedsoftware.org/

Impacting Adversary ROI

Recently i was looking talks on RSA 2012. One talk  which got my attention is   Adversary ROI: Why Spend $40B Developing It, When You Can Steal It for $1 M.  Two points i liked most are

1. The Adversary Doesn’t Care About Your ROI/ROSI.

2. Whatever security measures you put should reduced the the  Adversary ROI  .

Lets see the formula of adversary ROI

 

Adversary ROI= ((( Attack value (Value of Assets Compromised + Adversary Value of Operational Impact) - Cost of the Attack) x Probability of Success )/Cost of the Attack)-Deterrence Measures (% Chance of Getting Caught x Cost of Getting Caught)

                                                                                                                       

Most important factor of this ROI is the cost of the attack  if your security measures can increase the cost of attack ( which most of the measures do) it will reduce the adversary ROI by multi fold this the area where most of the security vendors focused there effort along with reducing the probability of the success. Advancement of attack tools and techniques reducing the attack cost and increasing the probability of success white hackers/Defenders caught themselves  in a rat race to build the countermeasures. As best practice multilayer security (IPS/IDS/Firewall/antimalware)has to be implement to affect these vectors of adversary ROI.

Let say after applying all the measures attacker still able to penetrate your system  but if you can be alarmed and act (here your various monitoring system play a great role for example File/Registry/Process Integrity monitoring system, Log Inspection system etc. ) before adversary able to steal/damage your assets this will reduce the  probability of success .

What if  your assets has been stolen/damaged before you able to act still there is hope in the form of  your risk management policy and forensics that can help in recovery and catching your adversary. These two factor increase the chance of catching the hacker.

Now there is one factor which you cannot control directly is the impact of getting caught it’s lot depend of the government/country rules and regulation how they treat your adversary.

while you can reduce the value of assets compromised  it’s not always possible and not advisable too  but you cannot control the Adversary Value of Operational Impact as it’s depends on type of adversary you are dealing with.

one this should be note here factor affecting adversary ROI should be considered  in totality not in isolation.

 

Reference.

http://365.rsaconference.com/servlet/JiveServlet/previewBody/3429-102-1-4545/GRC-202.pdf

Security Related Quotes

 

• A risk requires a threat and a vulnerability that results in a negative consequence.
• A Threat is an Actor with a Capability and a Motive.
• Casual Attacker power grows at the rate of Metasploit.
• PCI won’t stop a determined attacker, but it will at least stop a casual attacker.
• PCI is better than nothing – it at least raises the bar.
• The organization doesn’t often profit from security investments.
• Attack surface is approaching infinity (which is not a real number).
• ƒRisk Mitigated can be both subjective and objective.
• The Adversary Doesn’t Care About Your ROI/ROSI.
• The problem is that security is so complex that every topic has a huge amount of context associated with.
• Don’t let your project’s definition of security be driven by the signatures in a tool, external compliance requirements, or what happens to be in a particular penetration tester’s or developer’s head.
• There are simply far too many ways to write insecure code.
• We don’t need to fix those vulns; we have a WAF-  ROFL

Test Process Improvement manifesto

Flexibility over Detailed Processes

Best Practices over Templates

Deployment orientation over Process orientation

Reviews over Quality Assurance (departments)

Business driven over Model driven