Monday, September 3, 2012

The Rugged Software Manifesto

  • I am rugged and, more importantly, my code is rugged.
  • I recognize that software has become a foundation of our modern world.
  • I recognize the awesome responsibility that comes with this foundational role.
  • I recognize that my code will be used in ways I cannot anticipate, in ways it was not designed, and for longer than it was ever intended.
  • I recognize that my code will be attacked by talented and persistent adversaries who threaten our physical, economic, and national security.
  • I recognize these things - and I choose to be rugged.
  • I am rugged because I refuse to be a source of vulnerability or weakness.
  • I am rugged because I assure my code will support its mission.
  • I am rugged because my code can face these challenges and persist in spite of them.
  • I am rugged, not because it is easy, but because it is necessary and I am up for the challenge.

 

Reference: http://www.ruggedsoftware.org/

Thursday, August 30, 2012

Impacting Adversary ROI

Recently i was looking talks on RSA 2012. One talk  which got my attention is   Adversary ROI: Why Spend $40B Developing It, When You Can Steal It for $1 M.  Two points i liked most are

1. The Adversary Doesn’t Care About Your ROI/ROSI.

2. Whatever security measures you put should reduced the the  Adversary ROI  .

Lets see the formula of adversary ROI

 

Adversary ROI= ((( Attack value (Value of Assets Compromised + Adversary Value of Operational Impact) - Cost of the Attack) x Probability of Success )/Cost of the Attack)-Deterrence Measures (% Chance of Getting Caught x Cost of Getting Caught)

                                                                                                                       

Most important factor of this ROI is the cost of the attack  if your security measures can increase the cost of attack ( which most of the measures do) it will reduce the adversary ROI by multi fold this the area where most of the security vendors focused there effort along with reducing the probability of the success. Advancement of attack tools and techniques reducing the attack cost and increasing the probability of success white hackers/Defenders caught themselves  in a rat race to build the countermeasures. As best practice multilayer security (IPS/IDS/Firewall/antimalware)has to be implement to affect these vectors of adversary ROI.

Let say after applying all the measures attacker still able to penetrate your system  but if you can be alarmed and act (here your various monitoring system play a great role for example File/Registry/Process Integrity monitoring system, Log Inspection system etc. ) before adversary able to steal/damage your assets this will reduce the  probability of success .

What if  your assets has been stolen/damaged before you able to act still there is hope in the form of  your risk management policy and forensics that can help in recovery and catching your adversary. These two factor increase the chance of catching the hacker.

Now there is one factor which you cannot control directly is the impact of getting caught it’s lot depend of the government/country rules and regulation how they treat your adversary.

while you can reduce the value of assets compromised  it’s not always possible and not advisable too  but you cannot control the Adversary Value of Operational Impact as it’s depends on type of adversary you are dealing with.

one this should be note here factor affecting adversary ROI should be considered  in totality not in isolation.

 

Reference.

http://365.rsaconference.com/servlet/JiveServlet/previewBody/3429-102-1-4545/GRC-202.pdf

Security Related Quotes

 

  • A risk requires a threat and a vulnerability that results in a negative consequence.
  • A Threat is an Actor with a Capability and a Motive.
  • Casual Attacker power grows at the rate of Metasploit.
  • PCI won’t stop a determined attacker, but it will at least stop a casual attacker.
  • PCI is better than nothing – it at least raises the bar.
  • The organization doesn’t often profit from security investments.
  • Attack surface is approaching infinity (which is not a real number).
  • ƒRisk Mitigated can be both subjective and objective.
  • The Adversary Doesn’t Care About Your ROI/ROSI.
  • The problem is that security is so complex that every topic has a huge amount of context associated with.
  • Don’t let your project’s definition of security be driven by the signatures in a tool, external compliance requirements, or what happens to be in a particular penetration tester’s or developer’s head.
  • There are simply far too many ways to write insecure code.
  • We don’t need to fix those vulns; we have a WAF-  ROFL

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Test Process Improvement manifesto

Flexibility over Detailed Processes

Best Practices over Templates

Deployment orientation over Process orientation

Reviews over Quality Assurance (departments)

Business driven over Model driven

Monday, August 13, 2012

Manifesto for Agile Software Development

 

We are uncovering better ways of developing software by doing it and helping others do it. Through this work we have come to value:

Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
Working software over comprehensive documentation
Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
Responding to change over following a plan
That is, while there is value in the items on the right, we value the items on the left more.

Saturday, July 21, 2012

Parameterized Queries: Fix the Sql injection at root.

Sql Injection Is the most common vulnerability found in Web applications. whenever i talk about it’s prevention most common answer comes as input validation which is most cost effective and can be implemented without changing the code (using some third party product like WAF,IPS/IDS,Proxies) or without changing the sql statements by implementing such functions' in web application itself. But this is trivial to bypass ( we are living in the world where of hell lot of character encoding are supported) and many time lead to broken applications.

In this article i will try to explore the fixing the problem in it’s root . Modern application has been build using multi-tier architectures and most common architecture is 3-Tier Architecture.

3-Tier Architecture: This involves three layers Client layer, Server layer and business logic tier, service tier or middle tier (layer). In the client-server solution the client was handling the business logic that makes the client “thick”. A thick client means that it requires heavy traffic with the server, thus making it difficult to use over slower network connections like Internet and Wireless .

In 3-tier Architecture, the client is only handling presentation logic. This means that only little communication is needed between the client and the middle tier making the client “thin” . So a typical view would be Client tier <---> Middle tier<---> Database Tier

Many Developer believe that following Secure coding practice for middle tier only will prevent SQL injection which is not always true that we will see in short while.

not let’s have a look of a typical sql injection flaw

Dynamic Queries: The following (Java) example is would allow an attacker to inject code into the query that would be executed by the database. The unvalidated “userName” parameter that is simply appended to the query allows an attacker to inject any SQL code they want. Unfortunately, this method for accessing databases is all too common. this is also know as Dynamic Queries.

String query = "SELECT EmployeeId FROM Employee WHERE Emp_name = " + request.getParameter("userName");
Statement stmt = connection.createStatement();
ResultSet results = stmt.executeQuery( query );

In sql Community to make an sql statement Sql injection proof use of Parameterized Queries is highly recommended.

Parameterized Queries: They are are simple to write, and easier to understand than dynamic queries. Parameterized queries force the developer to first define all the SQL code, and then pass in each parameter to the query later. This coding style allows the database to distinguish between code and data, regardless of what user input is supplied.

Prepared statements ensure that an attacker is not able to change the intent of a query, even if SQL commands are inserted by an attacker.For example, if an attacker were to enter the userName of blah' or '1'='1, the parameterized query would not be vulnerable and would instead look for a Emp_name which literally matched the entire string blah' or '1'='1.

String username = request.getParameter("userName");
String query = "SELECT EmployeeId FROM Employee WHERE Emp_name = ? ";
PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement( query );
pstmt.setString( 1, username);
ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );

Another benefit of using Parameterized Queries is to get performance enhancements for details Pleas check http://www.simple-talk.com/sql/t-sql-programming/performance-implications-of-parameterized-queries/

Another method that can be use to make your database access Sql Injection proof is to use Stored procedures .

Stored procedures: They have the same effect as the use of prepared statements when implemented safely i.e Stored procedures must not use any dynamic Sql statements. It require the developer to define the SQL code first, and then pass in the parameters after. The difference between prepared statements and stored procedures is that the sql code for a stored procedure is defined and stored in the database itself, and then called from the application. Using this technique requires great interaction between database developer and middle tier developers.

String username = request.getParameter("username");
CallableStatement cstmt = connection.prepareCall("{call getEmpId(?)}");
cstmt.setString(1, username);
ResultSet results = cstmt.executeQuery();

References:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
http://blog.simcrest.com/what-is-3-tier-architecture-and-why-do-you-need-it/
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Query_Parameterization_Cheat_Sheet
http://www.simple-talk.com/sql/t-sql-programming/performance-implications-of-parameterized-queries/

Friday, July 13, 2012

SharePoint left naked for one month by HTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2012-1858



On 10th july MS released a security patch to Fix the Vulnerability in toStaticHTML API . This API  is found in Internet Explorer  8,9,  SharePoint and Lync. It  is used to sanitize HTML fragments from dynamic and potentially malicious content.
If an attacker is able to break the filtering mechanism and pass malicious code through this function, he/she may be able to perform HTML injection based attacks (i.e. XSS).
Microsoft has issued several updates to address this vulnerability.
MS12-037 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-037  Published: Tuesday, June 12, 2012
MS12-039 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-039 Published: Tuesday, June 12, 2012
Note here after one month MS released one more update for same Vulnerability.
MS12-050 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/MS12-050 Published: Tuesday, July 10, 2012
Now it’s very interesting that MS has Released it’s FIX for IE & Lync on June 12 and for SharePoint it released it’s fix on  July 10. So whoever has the knowledge that this particular API is used in SharePoint also they had the full 1 month to create the exploit and had a big window to Exploit this vulnerability on SharePoint.
Wondering what makes the MS to do that .Isn't that was a zero day for SharePoint??